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Abstract. The wage cost of time out of the labor force for childcare is important 
in order to understand the functioning of labor markets and for public policy. This 
paper reviews the literature and identifies several limitations. Using employment 
records of a large Swedish company over the period 1983-88, we demonstrate an 
alternative approach for estimating earnings effects and find a year out costs 1.7 
percent of earnings for a woman and 5.2 percent for a man. This large effect for 
men raises questions of signalling costs. For both men and women, earnings 
“rebound” for time out in the more distant past. 
Introduction 
What is the career earnings cost of time out of the labor force for 
the care of young children? This question has continued to receive 
much attention given the growth of dual earner couples in the 
industrialized countries. The effect of time out of the labor force, 
particularly in the early part of one’s career, is part of the more 
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general question of work history or on-the-job training effects on 
earnings. Labor force exit for childcare takes place during the early 
or high investment phase of the life cycle. Do such exits have long 
lasting effects or do earnings rebound after a short period of 
re-entry to full time work? Are there signalling costs, in the sense 
that, especially for men, employers may judge work commitment by 
length of time away? 
Research on these and related questions, starting with the early 
use of the National Longitudinal Surveys (Mincer and Polachek, 
1974) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (Hill, 1979; 
Corcoran and Duncan, 1979), has increasingly turned to panel data 
and estimation procedures to account for the endogeneity of spells 
out of the labor force (Gronau, 1988; Korenman and Neumark, 
1992). This more recent literature has confirmed the earlier finding 
(Hill, 1979) that marriage and number of children have an impact 
on earnings of women primarily via the extent to which they shape 
labor force attachment and work interruptions. In a review of the 
existing studies we show that beyond agreement that “work history 
matters,” there are widely disparate results: the impact of time out 
varies widely, for women from less than one 
percent per year; earnings recovery or ‘rebound” is sometimes 
present but not found consistently; and the effect of time out on 
men’s earnings is not estimated. The reason for these diverse 
findings, we believe, is a lack of accurate work history spell 
information and earnings change measures. 
The purpose of our paper is to examine the earnings effects of 
spells away from work or “time out” to care for young children. We 
accomplish this by using company panel data for a large multibranch 
company in Sweden over the period 1983-88.’ In Sweden childcare 
leave is paid by a national parental leave policy with no direct costs 
to employers of parents who use it (Sundstrom, 1993), and this 
raises additional questions of the financial incentives for employees 
to utilize the leave. On the employer’s side, however, there should 
be normal incentives to evaluate the effect of leave use on 
productivity and therefore base pay on leave history insofar as leave 
from work influences productivity. 
The company records in our study provide extremely accurate 
measures of the histoty of each spell (down to those less than a 
single workday!), which is important from an errors-in-variables 
perspective, and, as well, extremely accurate earnings information, 
which is important in the estimation of fixed-effect, wage-change 
equations. The detailed company records permit the construction of 
percent to eight 
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disaggregated measures of the timing and nature of the employee’s 
child leave histories for men and women. With these histories one 
can address questions such as the long versus short run impact of 
time away from work and whether long spells are more costly than 
a series of short exits with the same total time away from work. 
Despite the more equal sharing of household reponsibilities by 
men and women in Sweden (Juster and Stafford, 1991), an issue is 
the rather limited use of childcare leave by men. Several surveys 
have found that men express reluctance to take leave because their 
employer may infer this to indicate a weak work commitment. If so, 
a signalling equilibrium could occur where few men take leave in 
order to avoid being labelled as uncommitted to their work. 
Alternatively, men may be in jobs with a greater payoff to work 
experience, so that time off the job may simply have a greater 
human capital cost. 
The organization of this paper as as follows: In Section 1 we 
review the theory and related empirical literature on the relationship 
between time away from work for childcare and the impact on 
earnings. Section 2 provides an introduction to the special features 
of our dataset. Section 3 includes several parts: Part 3.1 presents: (i) 
the basic estimation of the fixed-effect model and addresses the 
question of whether a random effect model could be applied and (ii) 
the estimated cost of time away from work for men and women. 
Part 3.2 presents a disaggregation of time out into leave of different 
types and dates to examine several questions including the 
robustness of the model and “earnings rebound”.* Part 3.3 examines 
the question of endogeneity of the spells. A brief conclusion is 
offered in Section 4. 
1. The theory of lifetime earnings and existing research 
1.1. Human capital and signalling effects 
Why should work history matter? The most widely accepted view 
is that people acquire work-related skills on the job. For reasons of 
recouping investment costs as well as sustaining a stock of 
marketable skills in the face of depreciation, the expectation is that 
early life-cycle investments will be greater (Ryder, Stafford and 
Stephan, 1976; Blinder and Weiss, 1976). The same theory suggests 
that earlier in the lifecycle an exogenous drop in human capital 
would be “made up” as the person reapproaches the steady state.3 
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In this view of earnings it is skills and productivity that matter, and 
employers are assumed to be able to observe productivity. 
Suppose productivity is only partly observable (Medoff and 
Abraham, 1981) and employers must rely on indicators of 
productivity, effort, and career commitment (Spence, 1973). Taking 
time out may be such an indicator. We believe that there is evidence 
suggesting that spells away from work for childcare correlate 
positively with skills and motivation fo women and negatively with 
skills of men. If this is the case, women may take leave, in part, to 
establish a positive signal of productivity while men may seek to 
avoid the “stigma” or negative signal of their prod~ctivity.~ For this 
reason caution needs to be exercised in interpeting time out simply 
as a measure of reduced market productivity. In fact our results 
suggest that time away from work may have a different meaning for 
men and women. 
The notion of adverse signalling effects of benefit receipt has been 
offered in several areas such as unemployment payments, 
participation in training programs, use of targeted wage subsidies 
(Burtless, 1985), and welfare use (Moffitt, 1983). In the case of 
parental leave use we are able to rely on a variety of other studies 
of the reasons given by men and their spouses for the rather scant 
use of the system by men. These studies provide more direct 
confirmation of men’s aversion to use leave because of pressure 
from employers, co-workers and supervisors (see e.g. Haas, 1992). 
1.2. Ejdsting literature 
Most of the existing literature on work interruptions has 
approached the subject by trying to explain the male-female wage 
gap and especially why the correlation between marriage and 
earnings is positive for men but negative for women. The 
expectation is that marriage has these divergent effects on the 
earnings of men and women because children are associated with a 
less consistent work history for women but a more consistent work 
history for men; in addition there is a presumption that more able 
men (via long run income effects, if marriage is a normal good) are 
more likely to marry. The implication is that better measures of 
ability and work history will show that it is not marriage per se that 
matters for earnings, but the way in which marriage and family 
relate to work history and consequent market skills of men and 
women. For this reason much of this research has an emphasis of 
the role of work history vk-h-vk marriage and children. 
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Table I presents a summary of findings from a selection of studies 
examining the effect of time out of the labor force for childcare on 
earnings of men and women. As can be seen the literature 
interconnects with that on the effects of marriage on the earnings of 
men and women. The studies commonly use panel data for the 
purpose of constructing work history variables (e.g. Mincer and 
Polachek, 1974; Corcoran and Duncan, 1979) and less commonly 
use panel data to create an earnings change measure (Mincer and 
Ofek, 1982; Corcoran et al. 1983). The impact on (younger) women’s 
earnings of one year out of the labor force (often presumed to be 
for care of young children) is estimated to be in the range of 0.5 
percent (Corcoran and Duncan, 1979) to 5.0 percent (for women 
under age 34) (Groot, Schippers and Siegers, 1988).The effects of 
marriage on women’s earnings are reduced or fully disappear when 
work history variables are added to the earnings equation (Hill, 
1979; Dolton and Makepeace, 1987; Nakosteen and Zimmer, 1987; 
Korenman and Neumark, 1992). 
There is some discussion of long versus short term wage impacts 
of time out. Only a couple of studies specifically attempt such an 
estimate (Mincer and Ofek, 1982; Corcoran, Duncan and Ponza, 
1983). However, the basis for the inference of both these studies 
that short-term effects are, as predicted by theory, more pronounced 
(5-8 percent and three percent, respectively) than long-term effects 
(1.5-1.8 percent), is a comparison of a cross-sectional (“long-run”) 
wage equation with a wage change (“short run”) equation. This 
inference is limited by the fact that their change equation is really a 
type of fixed effects model, and most of the difference with the 
cross-sectional may be simply the consequence of different 
estimation procedures. 
Another pattern observed in some studies is the small (Corcoran 
and Duncan, 1979) or even positive effect (Gustafsson, 1981, for 
those other than age 30-44 years old) of time out. With a 
cross-sectional estimate, it is possible that the more ambitious and 
productive women take more time out, particularly in US data on 
families before 1975. The early Postwar US pattern was for more 
educated, higher wage women to work more except when preschool 
children were present, when hours of market work were less than 
for those with lower levels of education (Bowen and Fingegan, 
1969). By extension, women with higher (unobserved) wage 
potential may take more leave. Women in the US return to work 
very soon after a child is born (Leibowtiz, Klerrnan and Waite, 
1992) and work much longer hours than women in other countries 
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(Gustafsson and Stafford, 1994) suggesting a high career cost to 
time out in the US. If leave is positively correlated with unobserved 
productivity the actual cost of time out would be larger than 
suggested by cross-sectional estimates and may explain the 
difference between the cross sectional and panel or fixed effect 
results reported in Mincer and Ofek (1982) and Corcoran, Duncan 
and Ponza (1983). 
Some more recent papers address the question of whether poor 
labor market prospects, possibly from discrimination, discourage 
participation, so that time out (Gronau, 1988; Kim and Polachek, 
1994) or fertility status (Korenman and Neumark, 1992) is 
endogenous, with a resulting bias toward finding an effect of time 
out (or children) when in fact none exists (or the effect is small). 
While these studies are suggestive of discouragement effects, as 
Gronau notes in such a “simultaneous-equation scheme it is hard to 
justify the choice of labor force experience, tenure and occupational 
choice as exogenous variables” (p. 295). 
AII of the studies in Table 1 have serious data limitations. 
Hometime is often aggregated temporally into an overall total of 
years out of the labor force and measured as the residual of age 
( - 5 )  less years of schooling and work experience (e.g. Kim and 
Pollachek). Even when separate segments of time out of the labor 
force are available, they are likely to be subject to substantial recall 
error given that respondents commonly report on events spanning at 
least a calendar year. To estimate an earnings change/fixed-effects 
equation, accurate data on earnings are required or else much of the 
apparent change will be dominated by measurement error. Our 
company data have only a small number of variables for the 
employee and none for the spouse or children, but have as their 
strength very accurate histories of parental leave and very accurate 
earnings data. 
2. Time out: spells of childcare leave from company data 
We utilize two samples. One is a random one in 15 sample of 
2,200 out of all Swedish National Telephone Company employees in 
1983 and the other is of all employees who had any parental leave in 
1983. Both samples have complete leave records over the period of 
observation, January 1, 1983 to December 31, 1987. Upper 
management is excluded from both samples. The time period 
covered was one of tight labor markets, so that the diverse regional 
8 Fondazione Giamrno Brodolini 1996. 
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offices are assumed to have faced competitive labor markets, and 
the telephone company jobs are ones with substantial on-the-job 
training, as evidenced by the presence of company sponsored 
training programs. 
In neither sample can we observe directly whether the employee 
has had a child or when it arrived. What has been recorded is the 
use of various paid leave options; leave for care of the newborn (a 
maximum of 360 days) and occasional care of children (a maximum 
of 60 days per year and child) as well as unpaid leave for childcare 
(see Sundstrom and Stafford, 1992 for a closer presentation).’ In 
each of the years, 1983-87, about 30 percent of the men and 38 
percent of the women had some days of parental leave. Over the 
whole 5-year period 43 percent of the men and 45 percent of the 
women had used some parental benefits. 
Among women and men of childbearing ages the proportion of 
leave users is much higher: 82 percent of all women aged 30-44 in 
1983 took at least some days of leave as did 74 percent of the men 
in these age ranges. But women use many more days than men; 
when measured in full-time equivalents women used about 130 days 
per year, on average, compared to only about 13 days per year for 
men who used leave benefits. The high number of average days used 
over the five year period, especially by female users, indicates the 
program really is important and has the potential to shape lifetime 
decisions. Among female users, almost one and one-half of five 
years were full-time equivalent leave. 
In Table 2 the usage of parental leave for newborn children and 
other types of time out (occasional care and unpaid leave) for the 
random, one in 15 samples are presented. Here we analyze total 
days of leave rather than spell histories (which are discussed in 
Section 3.3). By far the major share of leave benefits for care of 
newborns are used by women, with about 31 percent using such 
leave during the period 1983-87 and the days per user averaging 
226. The corresponding figures for men ar about 15 percent and 29 
days, respectively. On an annual basis the company data seem in line 
with averages for the country. In 1987 men used 7.5 percent of such 
leave days (National Insurance Board, 1992), while for our sample 
men used 5.4 percent of the leave days for newborns (5.7 percent 
over the period 1983-87). 
Leave days for occasional care of children are used to a more 
equal extent by men and women, and this is partly because there is 
a set of benefit days which are only available for men’s use (“daddy 
days”) as part of a policy to encourage greater use by men. 
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However, even netting out these days, nationally, fathers used 35 
percent of the occasional leave days in 1987 (National Insurance 
Board, 1992, p. 28). Unpaid leave is almost exclusively used on a 
part-time basis (i.e. in the form of reduced hours) and is far more 
likely to be used by women (averaging 157 days over the five year 
period) than men (averaging only three days over the five year 
period) for our employee sample. Does part-time leave allow one to 
maintain skills or does it have a significant earnings cost (Jones and 
Long, 1979)? 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the one in 15 
company sample in 1983 and 1988. The education, work histories 
(tenure with the company and potential experience outside the 
company) are fairly similar for men and women. The main 
differences are in the cumulated time out of the labor market, in the 
different types of leave and in the cumulated time in company 
sponsored training programs. Men averaged a mere 17.8 days of 
leave over the five-year period, while women average 238.0 days. 
Men's days in company sponsored training programs averaged 
'hble 2. Childcare leave and other time out for men and women in the 
Swedish Telephone Company 
Men Women 
Leave Days Leave Days 
users, % per user users, % per user 
Leave for care of newborn 1983" 6.2 13.5 15.8 114.9 
1984 6.6 16.3 15.0 89.8 
1987 3.9 18.7 15.3 83.0 
1983-87 14.6 28.7 30.9 226.0 
Leave for occasional care 1983 28.5 7.8 29.0 7.6 
1984 26.6 7.5 28.4 7.1 
1987 24.9 7.9 28.3 7.2 
1983-87 42.3 24.7 40.7 27.6 
Unpaid leave for care of 1983 2.8 53.6 28.9 250.0 
children 1984 1.6 60.8 17.2 180.6 
1987 1.0 18.6 14.9 68.3 
1983-87 5.6 57.3 37.8 414.8 
'Year refers to the year the leave began and the means are calculated over the whole leave 
spell, whether or not it ended in the same calendar year. Part-time leave days have been 
converted into full-time equivalents 
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almost 54 days compared to about 33 days for women over the five 
year period. How do these work history differences affect earnings? 
Is time out subject to a wage penalty? Is training time important for 
earnings growth of men and women? 
3. Time out and earnings growth 
3.1. Fixed versus random effects models 
To assess the impact of family leave on male and female wage 
growth we employ a simple human capital wage equation (Mincer, 
1974; Blinder, 1976). The specification is one in which the earnings 
variable is shifted by years of education (SCHOOLING) and all 
'Rible 3. Variables and means for men and women in the one in fifteen 
sample, 1983 and 1988 
Women Men 







Potential experience x tenure 
Schooling' 
Company training daysd 
Leave days 1983-87 
Care of newborns 
Occasional care 
Unpaid leave 


























































Nore: Potential experiencc. tenure and schooling are measured in years and company training 
and leave are measured in days. Since we have no information on parental leave and 
company training prior to 1983. these variables are 0 as of (January 1) 1983. 
"In 1988 prices. hPotential experience outside of the company is defined as Age-Schooling- 
Tenure-7, given that Swedish school starts at age 7. ' Normal years of study for the educational 
level completed. "Number of days in company training programs, 1983-1987. These are 
programs paid for by the company and compensated at the usual rate of pay. 
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leave days 1983-87 (TOTAL TIME OUT) and company training 
days 1983-87 (CO-TRAINING). Using potential experience as of 
1988 (POTEXP88) and years of tenure with the company as of 1988 
(TENURE88) and the interaction between tenure and potential 
experience (POTEXTP88 x TENURE88) as the work history 
variables, the earnings equation applied to our sample is 
In EARN88, = bo + blPOTEXP88, + b2(POTEXP88,)’ 
+b3TENURE88, +b4(TENURE88,)’ 
+ bS(POTEXP88 x TENURE88), + bbSCHOOLING, 
+b,COTRAINING, +b,TOTALTIMEOUT, +e88, [11 
where In EARN88, is the natural logarithm of full-time equivalent 
monthly earnings for the ith individual. 
A cross-sectional estimation of ( 1 )  has the well-known limitation 
of a potential and presumed omitted variable bias: here TOTAL 
TIME OUT or CO-TRAINING could be correlated with unobserved 
variables such as motivation, or even commonly measured variables 
but ones which were not available in the company dataset. Under 
these conditions the recommended procedure is to employ a fixed 
effects or random effects model. We can postulate that 
e88, = u, +u88,, PI 
with u, time constant, person-specific “fixed” effect and 2.488, as an iid 
white noise disturbance. Then from a 1983 version of ( 1 )  we can 
create a change equation 
In EARN881 -In EARN83, =go + bl(POTEXP88, - POTEXP83,) 
+ b2(POTEXP88: - POTEXP83,*) 
-+ b3(TENURE88, - TENURE83,) 
-+ b4( TENURE88,’ - TENURE83;) 
+bS((POTEXP88, x TENURE88,) 
- (POTEXP83, x TENURE83,)) 
+ b,(SCHOOLING88, - SCHOOLING83,) 
+ b,(COTRAINING 1983-87,) 
+b,(TOTALTIMEOUT1983-87,) + (U 88, -u83,) 131 
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where the three first terms cancel out as does schooling, since there 
is no change 'in formal schooling in our sample. 
In Table 4 we present estimation results for women and men 
using the different estimation approaches. The regressions include 
only those individuals that were still employed in 1988. Since only 73 
persons (3.2 percent of the sample) left the company before 1988, 
this is unlikely to cause any serious bias. A main finding is that the 
impact of total time out is to reduce earnings. In the fixed effects 
model for women the impact of total time out in reducing earnings 
is larger than in the cross-sectional model. Exactly the opposite is 
Table 4. Wage effects of total time out for childcare, 1983-88 - one in 
fifteen sample (t-values in parentheses) 
Women Men 
Cross- Change Cross- Change 
section88" 1983-88' section88' 1983-88' 
CONSTANT 
POTEXP' 
POTEXP ( x  
TENURE88 
TENURE* ( x 
POTEXP XTENURE ( x 
SCHOOLING 
COTRAINING ( x 10-3) 

































































'The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the monthly full-time equivalent wage in 
1988. 
bThe dependent variable is the difference in the natural logarithms of the monthly full-time 
equivalent wage in 1988 and that of 1983 (in 1988 prices). 
'Potential non-company experience is defined as AGE-SCHOOLING-TENURE-7 given that 
Swedish school starts at age 7. 
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observed for men with the earnings reductions from total time out 
being smaller in the fixed effects model. One interpretation of these 
differences is that there is an unmeasured variable called 
“motivation” (or other unobserved factors affecting labor market 
success), and that more motivated women and less motivated men 
take time out from their careers. As a result the fured effect model 
is needed to show that it really is more costly for women to take 
leave than would appear to be the case from cross-sectional 
estimates. This suggests that some of the findings of low wage 
penalties using cross sectional data on earnings (reported in Table 
1) may have understated the cost of time out. From Table 4 time 
out has a cost (converted to an annual rate 365/1000x0.046 and 
exponentiated) of 1.7 percent for women and 5.2 percent for men. 
To check for the possibility of non-linearities in the effects of leave 
we also experimented with a squared term for leave days but it 
turned out neither to be significantly different from zero, nor to 
improve the fit of the models. 
An interesting methodological point is that the predictive 
power of the fixed effects model is quite strong, as we would 
expect given company earnings records rather than respondent 
reports of earnings. When respondent reports are used the 
problem of measurement error becomes more limiting (Duncan and 
Stafford, 1980; Bjorklund, 1989), and R2 values commonly drop 
dramatically to as low as a few percent or less. The reason for the 
low predictive power and concomitant fall in parameter precision in 
fixed effects models employing data from respondent reports of 
earnings can be seen from the methodological work on the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (Duncan and Hill, 1985). In contrast to 
data from company records, reported annual earnings are 
characterized by high levels of measurement error, and the 
measurement error is weakly autocorrelated. As a result, much of 
the variance of the dependent variable, change in reported earnings, 
is error variance. 
If fixed effects were small or uncorrelated with variables of 
interest, one could employ a random effects model and obtain both 
unbiased and more efficient parameter estimates in Table 4. 
However, a specification test in regression format proposed by 
Hausman (1978, p. 1263) decisively rejected the random-effects 
model for both men (F(5,1300) = 129) and women (F(5,871) = 145) 
(see also e.g. Hsiao 1986, p. 48). For this reason we focus on the 
fixed effects model here and for a disaggregation of time out into 
various components. Estimates of the wage growth from company 
Q Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini 1996. 
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training programs (measured in days) with the fixed effects model 
indicate a strong effect, particularly for women. 
3.2. vpes  of time out and earnings rebound 
To address the question of the effects of different types of time 
out, Table 5a shows the CARE OF NEWBORNS and UNPAID 
LEAVE have the strongest statistical impacts on earnings growth of 
women, and leave for OCCASIONAL CARE, the main form of 
time out for men (Table 2), has the strongest effect on wage growth 
of men. Table 5b examines the “earnings rebound” question by 
disaggregating the leave types with the most impact on earnings into 
recent time out (1987) and most distant time out (1983) while 
controlling for other days of parental leave. There does appear to be 
a tendency for more recent leave spells to be more costly and for 
earnings to rebound from leave taken five years earlier in the 
fixed-effect case. The difference is most pronounced (for women) in 
UNPAID LEAVE87 (-0.111 x compared with UNPAID 
LEAVE83 ( - 0.042 x 
Table 5a. Wage effects of different types of childcare leave in 1983-88 - 
one in fifteen sample (t-values in parentheses) 
Women Men 
Cross- Change Cross- Change 
section88” 1983-88’ section88“ 1983-88’ 
Time out for 
CARE OF NEWBORN ( x lo-’) 0.005 
OCCASIONAL CARE ( x  0.117 
(0.81) 
(0.74) 




UNPAID LEAVE ( x  lo-’) -0.010 
- 0.043 














“The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the monthly full-time equivalent wage in 
1988. 
’The dependent variahle is the difference in the natural logarithms of the monthly full-time 
equivalent wage in 1988 and that of 1983 (in 1988 prices). 
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3.3. Is time out endogenous? 
The literature on time out has recently addressed the question of 
potential endogeneity of time out of the labor force. Do poor 
earnings prospects encourage longer spells and more frequent spells 
out of the labor force? To check whether there still remains 
endogeneity between time out and wages in our data after the 
person-specific have been purged one would compare the 
fixed-effects estimates with those obtained by a fixed-effects 
instrumental variables estimation, i.e. a Wu test (Wu, 1973). 
However, since we have no variables in our data set to use as 
Table 5b. Wage effects of leave in 1983 and 1987 - one in fifteen sample 
(t-values in parentheses) 
Women Men 
Cross- Change Cross- Change 
section88" 1983-88* section88" 1983-88h 
Time out for 
CARE OF NEWBORN83 ( x  lo-') 
CARE OF NEWBORN87 ( x  lo-') 
OCCASIONAL CARE83 ( x lo-') 
OCCASIONAL CARE87 ( x lo-') 
UNPAID LEAVE83 ( x  lo-') 
UNPAID LEAVE87 ( x  lo-') 
OTHER PARENTAL LEAVE ( x lo-')' 











































"The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the monthly full-time equivalent wage in 
1988. 
hThe dependent variable is the difference in the natural logarithms of the monthly full-time 
equivalent wage in 1988 and that of 1983 (in 1988 prices). 
'For women: days of parental leave in 1983-87 excluding care of newborn in 1983 and 1987 and 
unpaid leave in 1983 and 1987. For men: days of parental leave 1983-87 excluding occasional 
care for children in 1983 and 1987. 
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instruments for time out, we instead chose to examine the use of the 
system by analyzing the exits from spells of paid leave. The main 
point is that time out (both paid and unpaid, from a Tobit model of 
leave) by women in the one in 15 sample is positively related to 
education and rank within the company (Sundstrom, 1991). 
Moreover, paid paternal leave has a benefits structure which 
encourages use for the duration of benefit eligibility. To see this we 
constructed a variable for the leave user sample, “significant paid 
parental leave”, as a leave lasting more than 105 calendar days 
(Sundstrom, 1993, p. 11-13). 
Figure I portrays the exit rates from such spells. The concentrated 
densities at 180, 270, and 360 days reflect convenience in scheduling 
combined with the benefit structure. Many users simply utilize a six 
month, 180 day leave, possibly for purposes of work scheduling by 
the supervisor. A large share of users end their spell at 270 days 
since up to that point leave is compensated at 90% of prior take 
home pay. Beyond that point up to 360 days, benefits are available 
only at a reduced amount, independent of prior earnings (at the 
“flat rate”), and a smaller concentration exits at 360 days. One 
motivation for exit at 180 days is for purposes of “benefit banking”: 
the payments are available up to eight years after the child’s birth, 
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so return to work before 270 days allows some “savings” for future 
use or to allow the father to take some leave. 
A simultaneously estimated, competing risks hazard model of 
women’s first exits from paid leave is presented in Table 6. This 
again shows the high concentration of exit intensities at 180, 270 and 
a b l e  6. Competing risks of exit from paid parental leave among women. 
Leaver user sample. 1983-87 
Exit-specific effects 
Exit to Exit to Exit to 
full-time part-time unpaid leave 
Overall rate (per 10,000) 
Overall rate relative to col. 3 
Educational 1. No gymnasium 
level 2. Gymnasium 1-2 years 
(p = 0.095) 3. Gymnasium 3 years 
4. More than gymnasium 
Working hours 1. Full-time 
in 1983 2. Part-time 
(p = 0.0086) 
Calendar days: 1. 0-105 days 
(p=O.o004) 2. 106-169 days 
3. 170-179 days 
4. 180days 
5. 181-259 days 
6. 260-269 days 
7. 270 days 
8. 271-359 days 
9. 360days 
10. 361-600 days 
Cohort 1. 1938-42 





4.75 0.19 1 .oo 
1 1 1 
0.92 1.36 0.70 
0.88 1.41 1.21 
1.72 18.62 0 
1 1 1 
0.68 1.43 0 
0 0 0 
0.46 0.48 0.27 
1.06 0 0.20 
64.78 10.88 34.30 
1 1 1 
2.11 0 0 
84.27 54.87 14.20 
3.40 3.08 0.48 
66.69 80.48 50.70 
9.49 28.25 10.82 






Note: Covariates have been tested for significance using a likelihood ratio test and leaving out 
one factor at a time. P-values are given in parentheses. Tenure, wage and co-training all 
had higherp-values than 0.20. Risks are given relative to the baseline level for each factor 
separately. This level is indicated by the value 1 (without decimals). Zero risks (without 
decimals) means that there are exposures but no occurrences. 
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360 days. More educated women are more likely to exit to full-time 
work and to part-time work (although the latter is not a frequent 
exit type). Prior part-time work predicts exit to part-time work. 
Older women are more likely to exit, and this is explained by 
preferential access to public daycare if a sibling is already enrolled. 
Older women are more likely to have another child already enrolled. 
For this reason they are more likely to find a space for their 
youngest child and thereby return to work. We infer that there is a 
tendency for the better paid and more educated women to return to 
work sooner. Inclusion of the monthly full-time wage turned out not 
to significantly improve the fit of the model, however, not even when 
education and tenure were left out. This absence of wage impact on 
the exit rate is understandable against the background of the 90% 
compensation rate and the low wage dispersion among the 
employees (Sundstrom, 1993, p. 28). There are also program 
incentives shifting returns in a somewhat random manner and this 
latter influence reduces the potential problems of simultaneity 
between time out and wage growth. We conclude that while time 
out and wage growth are potentially jointly endogenous, this is 
unlikely to be a serious concern in our sample. 
4. , Conclusion 
In this study we have had an opportunity to use a special data set 
which, we believe, allows a better look at the question of how time 
out affects career earnings. The reason for this is availability of 
accurate measures of time out of the labor force and earnings 
change for a sample of Swedish workers. While they are all in one 
company, the company has diverse tasks and is geographically 
dispersed throughout Sweden. At the time the data were gathered 
there were reasonably tight labor markets, and the company was 
presumably required to formulate wage offers to compete in this 
market. This implies that wages and wage growth had to be in line 
with productivity in the larger labor market. 
We find that (i) time out is costly for both women and men 
(about 1.7% and 5.2% per year, respectively), (ii) earnings do 
appear to rebound from time out in the more distant past, (iii) some 
of the cost of time out for men can plausibly be regarded as the 
result of signalling effects, (iv) application of fixed effects models 
holds promise in the study of earnings change, so long as accurate 
measures of earnings and earnings change are available, (v) 
0 Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini 1996. 
Effects on Earnings of Time Out for Childcare 627 
endogeneity in leave days and wage growth is unlikely to  confound 
the results in our  study, and (vi) part-time work (indexed by unpaid 
leave in our data) has an earnings growth cost. 
Notes 
‘The company is the Swedish national telephone company, Televerket. Televerket 
(now Telia) competes in local labor markets throughout Sweden, so that their pay 
policy has to reflect the going terms in the labor market. The period, 1983-88, was 
one of tight labor markets in Sweden, further placing labor market pressure on the 
company. Also important is that the jobs at Televerket are subject to substantial 
technical change, motivating an interest in work history and on-the-job training by 
both the company and employees. 
’Men take far fewer leave days, so for them much less in the way of 
disaggregation is possible. 
‘Suppose the individual is well below steady state earnings capacity at labor force 
entry. The normal (finite) life cycle path can be described as one in which skills are 
built up and approach the steady state from below, staying near the steady state for 
much of the middle career, and then declining as retirement approaches. An 
unanticipated spell out of the market early in the career will be substantially “made 
up” as the steady state is reapproached. For an anticipated spell out of the labor 
force there will likewise be a “rebound” as the steady state is reapproched. In the 
case of anticipated exits there would be a smaller pre-existing capital stock, 
permitting a faster closing of the gap at labor market reentry. 
‘As in the basic signalling model (Spence, 1973), suppose parental leave does not 
truly affect one’s lifetime productivity much at all, but is simply correlated 
(negatively) with productivity. If more able men have a lower cost of avoiding such 
leave episodes, an equilibrium can be sustained where more able men avoid parental 
leave and employers rewarding them with a higher wage find it worthwhile. 
‘It is important to note that leave benefits are funded out of general revenues in 
Sweden so that the employer should be interested in the leave effects on 
productivity and has no incentive to manage or influence leaves for the purpose of 
coiltrolling payment of leave benefits to the employees. 
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